



Competition against Peer-to-peer Networks
Citation for published version (APA):
Herings, P. J. J., Peeters, R. J. A. P., & Yang, S. (2010). Competition against Peer-to-peer Networks.
Information Economics and Policy, 22(4), 315-331. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2010.07.004





Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Document license:
Taverne
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.




Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 03 Nov. 2021
Information Economics and Policy 22 (2010) 315–331Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Information Economics and Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/ locate / iepCompetition against peer-to-peer networks
P. Jean-Jacques Herings ⇑, Ronald Peeters, Michael S. Yang
Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c tArticle history:









P2P (peer-to-peer) file-sharing networks
Network externalities
Pricing




Herings), R.Peeters@maastrichtuniversity.nl (R. Pee
trichtuniversity.nl (M.S. Yang).In this paper, we consider the competition of a monopolistic provider of information prod-
ucts against a peer-to-peer file-sharing network that offers illegal versions of the products.
We focus on the role of direct externalities caused by the P2P file-sharing technology rather
than the indirect consumption externalities studied previously in the literature. In our
model the market structure is endogenous and we characterize three possible scenarios
where the firm uses monopoly pricing, network-deterring pricing, and network-accommo-
dating pricing, respectively. We make a full comparative-static analysis of prices, quanti-
ties, profits, consumer surplus and total surplus for each of the scenarios as well as a
comparison across scenarios. We show that in the case of network-accommodating pricing,
the firm sets a higher price when facing a lower generic cost factor of downloading.
Furthermore, in all scenarios, profits for the firm unambiguously decrease when the
generic cost factor of downloading declines; total welfare unambiguously increases,
however, a result that has implications for intellectual property rights enforcement policy.
 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The tremendous amount of downloading and sharing of
information goods on the internet in the past 10 years is
largely due to the wide-spread popularity of P2P (peer-
to-peer) file-sharing networks. The information content
providers have, over the years, claimed that the usage of
such file-sharing networks constitutes the primary cause
of the steady decrease in their sales revenue, and they have
resorted to law suits against the users of such networks on
numerous occasions. Anti-piracy organizations have also
contributed considerable work in helping the authorities
reinforce intellectual property rights. Despite all their
efforts, however, the file-sharing activities have, if any-
thing, steadily increased in the past years, thanks to the
increasing sophistication and non-tractability of today’s
file-sharing applications.. All rights reserved.
y.nl (P. Jean-Jacques
ters), S.Yang@maas-The classical literature related to piracy can be traced
back to a couple of decades ago. Typical papers include for
example Novos and Waldman (1984), Liebowitz (1985),
Johnson (1985), where the authors study how a firm can re-
act to piracy. Basically there are three possibilities: do not
react at all if piracy poses no real threat; use piracy-deter-
ring pricing; or use piracy-accommodating pricing. For a
systematic analysis of the short- and long-run conse-
quences of illicit copying of information goods, we refer to
Belleflamme (2003).
In parallel, the literature on network externalities has
been developed, represented by classical papers including,
e.g. Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986) and Farrell and Saloner
(1985, 1986). Conner and Rumelt (1991) and Takeyama
(1994) combine the two subjects and find that unautho-
rized reproduction of intellectual property in the presence
of consumptive externalities can induce greater firm
profits and lead to Pareto improvements.
More recently, since the rise and fall of the first gener-
ation peer-to-peer technology Napster and the controversy
that ensued, a wave of new papers emerged to specifically
tackle the P2P phenomenon. Gayer and Shy (2003) show
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networks to enhance sales of their products sold in stores.
This result follows from the positive consumptive external-
ities in their model. Another way in which firms can bene-
fit from P2P activities is in set-ups with imperfect
information about product characteristics. The effects of
sampling possibilities due to P2P networks are studied by
Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006b). The authors show that un-
der sufficient taste heterogeneity and product diversity,
the positive effect of downloading on sales due to sampling
may compensate the negative effect. Peitz and Waelbroeck
(2006a) provide a comprehensive review of the recent lit-
erature on piracy of digital products.
While consumption externalities are very important for
software products, for the majority of illegal content
shared on P2P networks (music, movies, etc.), this effect
plays a role of lesser importance. We abstract from con-
sumption externalities, but instead focus on the network
externalities caused by the working principle of the P2P
file-sharing network itself. A higher number of users of a
network improves the availability of files and hence de-
creases the standard search costs and downloading time.
It is precisely this network effect that we focus on in this
study. This effect is not linear. The marginal benefit of an
additional user joining the network is positive, but
decreasing in the network size. Therefore, we implement
a cost function of downloading that is decreasing and con-
vex in the number of users of the P2P network.
Apart from the network size, the cost function of down-
loading is influenced by a parameter called the generic cost
factor of downloading. This parameter represents a collec-
tion of factors that may affect downloading costs; for in-
stance: population computer literacy, the availability of
broadband internet infrastructure, and most importantly,
the degree of legal enforcement of intellectual property
rights. Observe that unlike Gayer and Shy (2003), legal
buyers of the product do not benefit from the number of
downloading users, which distinguishes our downloading
externalities from consumption externalities. We also ab-
stract from other factors that tend to benefit the firm sell-
ing the product like imperfect information of product
characteristics, or the possibility of indirect appropriation
of rents (Liebowitz, 1985). This eliminates channels
through which the firm can benefit from piracy, and it is
a priori unclear how total surplus is affected by piracy.
We consider a monopolistic firm that is confronted with
an illegal P2P network. We refer to the legal product sold
by the firm as the physical form and the P2P version of it
as the digital form. These two forms, although essentially
providing similar contents, differ in numerous ways. The
physical form of the product is sold by the firm as CDs or
DVDs, usually accompanied by appealing packaging and
complementary booklets. The digital form, which is shared
on the internet via P2P networks, contains largely the same
content, although often of discounted quality. It does not
have the nice complementary features that the physical
form does, and the quality of the content is often inferior.
We model the interaction of the firm and the P2P net-
work as a two-stage game. In the first stage, the firm sets a
price for the physical form of the product. Then, in the sec-
ond stage, after having observed the price set by the firm,consumers simultaneously and independently decide
whether to legally buy the physical form, to download the
digital form via the P2P network, or not to acquire the con-
tent at all. The consumers are heterogenous with respect to
their tastes regarding the physical and the digital form, and
we use the standard Hotelling model to describe their pref-
erences. In their decision, consumers have to anticipate each
others’ decisions, since the resulting network size deter-
mines the actual costs of downloading. This distinguishes
our model from the literature on copying (Belleflamme,
2003), where network effects are absent and decisions of
other consumers are irrelevant. We analyze the model by
studying its subgame-perfect Nash equilibria.
In the second stage of our game, consumers face a clas-
sical coordination problem. If they all expect that no one
will join the P2P network, then it is optimal for all of them
to buy the product legally from the firm. When the price
set by the firm is sufficiently high, there is a critical mass
(Economides and Himmelberg, 1995) such that a P2P net-
work of that size can be supported as an equilibrium,
where there is a marginal consumer that is indifferent be-
tween buying the physical form and downloading the dig-
ital form. Due to the positive downloading externalities,
this critical-mass network is destabilized when slightly
more consumers join it. Then, more and more consumers
join the network up to a size where a new marginal con-
sumer is indifferent between buying and downloading, or
where the network contains all consumers and everybody
is better off downloading.
We provide a full characterization of the subgame-per-
fect Nash equilibria of the model and then restrict atten-
tion to the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
where the network of maximal size forms whenever possi-
ble. We characterize the equilibrium market structures,
and analyze for each structure how the firm’s profit, the
consumers’ surplus and the total welfare are affected by
different parameters such as the degree of intellectual
property law enforcement and the consumers’ taste
heterogeneity.
We find that there are three possible equilibrium mar-
ket structures. Firstly, the firm may act as a traditional
monopoly, either with a partially-served or a fully-served
market. In particular, the P2P network does not form. For
this to occur, the intrinsic value of the physical form of
the product has to be substantially higher than that of
the digital form. Secondly, the firm may prevent the form-
ing of the network by means of a network-deterring pric-
ing policy. Again, the firm either partially or fully serves
the market. Finally, legal sales and the P2P network may
co-exist. In this case, the market is guaranteed to be fully
served.
Regarding the effect of the generic cost factor of down-
loading, we find that the larger this cost factor is, the less
likely that a P2P network will form, and the higher the
firm’s profit will be. Strikingly, once the market exhibits
co-existence of the two platforms, the smaller the cost fac-
tor is, the higher the price that is set by the firm. Despite
this pricing behavior, the firm’s profit unambiguously de-
clines as the cost factor decreases. In the partially-served
monopolistic market with network-deterring pricing and
the fully-served market with multi-platform co-existence,
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that it is welfare decreasing if authorities overemphasize
the protection of intellectual property rights for those con-
tents whose creators are not significantly hurt by consum-
ers’ free-riding.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 the two-stage model is described in detail. Next,
the consumers’ choices in the second stage, given the price
set by the firm in the first stage, are presented in Section 3.
Subsequently, in Section 4, the firm’s pricing decision in
the first stage, and the resulting market structures, are ana-
lyzed. In order to reduce multiplicity of equilibria, we re-
strict attention to the case with coordination on the
network of maximal size. The comparative statics of this
equilibrium with respect to the model’s parameters are
provided in Section 5. Sections 7 and 6 conclude and dis-
cuss the results.
2. The model
We consider a monopolistic firm offering an informa-
tion good and facing a P2P network. We model this situa-
tion by means of a two-stage game. In stage one, the firm
sets a price p for the physical form of the product. Next,
in stage two, after having observed the price set by the
firm, consumers decide simultaneously and independently
whether to purchase the physical form sold by the firm (S),
to download the digital form via the P2P network (N), or
not to acquire the product at all (;). We assume that there
is a continuum of consumers who differ in their relative
preferences of the physical form over the digital form. A
strategy of a consumer with identity x 2 [0,1] is a function
dx that maps any price p into her choice set:
dx : Rþ ! fS;N; ;g;
and we denote the profile of strategies by d = (dx)x 2 [0, 1].
The price p set by the firm and the profile of consumers’
strategies determine the sales s(p,d) by the firm and the
size n(p,d) of the network via
sðp;dÞ ¼ lðfx 2 ½0;1jdxðpÞ ¼ SgÞ and
nðp;dÞ ¼ lðfx 2 ½0;1jdxðpÞ ¼ NgÞ;
where l denotes the Lebesgue measure.1
We assume, for simplicity, that the firm has zero costs
in production and aims to maximize its profit, given by
pðp; dÞ ¼ p  sðp; dÞ:
The utility of a consumer with identity x 2 [0,1] is given by
Uxðp;dÞ ¼
b sx p if dxðpÞ ¼ S
c sð1 xÞ Cðnðp;dÞÞ if dxðpÞ ¼ N
0 if dxðpÞ ¼ ;;
8><
>:
where b > 0 and c > 0 represent the basic utility of the
physical and the digital form respectively. The identity
x 2 [0,1] reflects the consumer’s relative preference over
the two forms. The consumer with identity x = 0 has a1 In equilibrium, the sets of consumers buying from the firm and going to
the network, respectively, will be measurable.strong preference for the physical form, whereas the con-
sumer with identity x = 1 has a strong preference for the
digital form. For consumers x 2 (0,1), the acquisition of
one of the forms generates a disutility that depends on
the identity x and the parameter s > 0. The parameter s
captures the amount of heterogeneity in consumers’ tastes.
Finally, C(n) represents the costs of downloading when the
resulting network is of size n 2 [0,1].
We focus on the network externalities caused by the
working principle of the P2P file-sharing network itself. A
higher number of users of a network improves the avail-
ability of files and hence decreases the standard search
costs and downloading time. The marginal benefit of an
additional user joining the network is positive, but
decreasing in the network size. Therefore, we implement
a cost function of downloading that is decreasing and con-
vex in the number of users of the P2P network,2
CðnÞ ¼ r  ð1 nÞ2;
where r > 0 represents the generic cost factor of down-
loading, incorporating a collection of factors that may
affect downloading costs, for instance, population com-
puter literacy, the availability of broadband internet infra-
structure, and most importantly, the degree of legal
enforcement of intellectual property rights. Note that r is
identical for every consumer and is independent of the net-
work size.
We impose some assumptions on the relevant
parameters.
Assumption 1. b > c.
Personal preferences aside, the objective product qual-
ity of the original physical form is higher than that of the
digital form (which is ‘‘ripped” from the original).
Assumption 2. b > s and c > s.
Every consumer prefers a free physical product and a
costless download to not acquiring the product.
Assumption 3. r > c.
The generic cost factor of downloading is sufficiently
high such that when the network size is zero, no consumer
would like to join the network.
Although irrelevant for the economic implications
resulting from the model, we impose some assumptions
on the consumers’ behavior in case of indifference. When
a consumer is indifferent between buying from the firm
and not acquiring the product or between the firm and
the network, she chooses the firm. When she is indifferent
between the network and not acquiring the product, she
chooses the network. Thus, without loss of generality, we
assume a linear order of priority of the firm (S) above the
network (N), and the network (N) above not acquiring
the product (;).
Finally, we restrict our attention to the case where the
firm’s price is bounded from above by the maximum that2 The quadratic specification of the cost function for downloading
satisfies the qualitative properties just stated, while it preserves analytical
tractability of the model.
Fig. 1. Fully-served market and partially-served market.
Table 1
All possible market structures in stage 2.
Single-platformed Multi-platformed
Firm Network
Fully-served [S] [N] [S/N]
Partially-served [S/;] [;/N] [S/;/N]
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If p > b, all consumers would have negative utility level
from buying from the firm; hence the firm’s sales and prof-
it would be zero. The firm can always do better, in equilib-
rium, by lowering the price to the interval [0,b]. Therefore,
this assumption can be made without loss of generality
and does not impose any restrictions on the results.
In the following sections we present the subgame-per-
fect Nash equilibria of the model. As usual, we start the
analysis by determining the possible Nash equilibria for
each of the subgames. That is, we determine the Nash equi-
libria of the games in the second stage that result from
each possible first-stage price. Then, we consider the firm’s
pricing behavior in the first stage and find the subgame-
perfect Nash equilibria.3. Consumers’ choice
Firstly, we observe that if a consumer with identity x
chooses to buy from the firm, then in equilibrium all con-
sumers with identity less than x choose to buy from the
firm. Secondly, if a consumer with identity x chooses to
use the P2P network, in equilibrium all consumers with
identity larger than x choose to do so. This implies that
in equilibrium only a few market structures can arise,
where market structures can differ in two dimensions:
the degree to which consumers are served and the plat-
forms that are actively used. Regarding the first dimension,
the market can be fully served or partially served as is dis-
played in Fig. 1 for a multi-platformed market.3 Regarding
the second dimension we can have a multi-platformed mar-
ket or a single-platformed market with either the firm only
or the P2P network only. For the second stage, we can there-
fore restrict our attention to the six market structures de-
picted in Table 1. Observe that the situation in the graph
on the left of Fig. 1 is denoted by [S/N] and the one on the
right by [S/;/N].
Our assumption that r > c implies that the generic cost
factor of downloading is sufficiently high such that when
the network size is zero, no consumer can join the net-
work. This implies that if everybody expects that nobody
will join the network, we have a second-stage equilibrium
without network.
Now consider the case where the price set by the firm in
stage one is high enough to be consistent with the forma-
tion of a P2P network. The size of the smallest network that3 Notice that the vertical intercept of the utility level from the network is
endogenously determined by the resulting network size. The quantities z, zS
and zN are used for the analysis in the appendices.can be supported as a second-stage equilibrium given
some price set by the firm is called the critical-mass net-
work and is denoted by c.m. If all the consumers expect
that the network is like this, such expectations are self-
enforcing. There is one consumer who is indifferent
between buying and downloading and whose choice is
irrelevant since we have a continuum of consumers. All
consumers with higher utility from downloading are
strictly better off joining the network and all the other con-
sumers are strictly better off buying from the firm.
Since we have positive downloading externalities, the
critical-mass network is destabilized when slightly more
consumers, located closest to the indifferent consumer,
join it. If all consumers expect that the network is like this,
the consumer with the highest value of xbuying at the firm
will strictly prefer to download, and these expectations are
not compatible with a second-stage equilibrium. In that
case, there will be a maximum network, denoted by
m.n.that can be supported as a second-stage equilibrium,
where the maximal network may be the one with all con-
sumers in it.
The next proposition describes the possible second-
stage equilibrium market structures conditional on the
first-stage price set by the firm.
Proposition 1. Given the first-stage price p, the possible
equilibrium structures that can arise in the second stage are
½S if 0 6 p 6 b s;
½S=; if b s < p 6 b;
½S=Nc:m: if b cþ s
s2
r




















< p 6 b;
½S=Nm:n: if b cþ s
s2
r
6 p 6 b cþ s; and
½N if b cþ s < p 6 b:
Fig. 2. Scenario A.1 (left); scenario B.1 (right).
Table 2
Three segments of equilibrium structures.
Segment Starting
price (p‘)
Switching price (p) Ending
price (pa)
(a) 0 b  s b




1þ 4 rs2 ðc sÞ
q 
b
(c) b cþ s s2r b  c + s b
Table 3
Possible scenarios and corresponding parameter settings.
Scenario Location of switching
points
Parameter values






ðbÞ c P 2s s
2
r c 6 2s c P
2s2
r þ s
A.1 c P 2s s2r c 6 s
2
2rþ s








2rþ s 6 c 6 2s
2
r þ s






ðaÞ c P 2s











B.1 c < 2s s2r c 6 s
2
2rþ s








2rþ s 6 c 6 2s
2
r þ s
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[;] and [;/N]. Observe that for these structures to occur,
the consumer with identity 0 would get a negative util-
ity from buying from the firm, which implies p > b. This
case has been excluded.
[S]. Since r > c, this structure is consistent with an equi-
librium if and only if the consumer with identity 1 is
indifferent between not acquiring the product and buy-
ing from the firm, so b  s  p P 0, which is the case if
and only if 0 6 p 6 b  s.
[S/;]. Since r > c,for this structure to occur, the con-
sumer with identity 1 should get a negative utility from
buying from the firm, which is the case if and only if
p > b  s.
[S/N]. See Appendix A.
[S/;/N]. See Appendix B.
[N]. Note that for all Nash equilibria in this structure
n(p,d) = 1,so the costs of downloading are zero. Since
c > s, this structure appears as an equilibrium if and
only if the consumer with identity 0 prefers the net-
work over the firm, which is the case if and only if
p > b  c + s. h
A closer look at Proposition 1 reveals that the second-
stage equilibrium manifold consists of three segments of log-
ically connected equilibrium structures. They are: (a) the
no-network segment: [S]–[S/;], (b) the critical-mass-net-
work segment: [S/N]c.m.–[S/;/N]c.m., and (c) the maximum-
network segment: [S/N]m.n.–[N]. A graphical representation
of these segments is provided in Fig. 2. As we will explain la-
ter, the parameters give rise to five possible scenarios, two of
which are illustrated in Fig. 2.
The three segments share the common property that
they begin at a certain price with one of the equilibrium
structures, switch to the other equilibrium structure at a
higher price and end with that second structure at an even
higher price. Table 2 summarizes, for each of the three seg-
ments, the starting, switching and ending prices, which are
denoted by p‘, p and pa respectively.
Notice that up to a price of p‘ðb;cÞ ¼ b cþ s s
2
r there
is a unique equilibrium where all consumers choose to
buy from the firm, and that for higher prices there are
three equilibria—one for each segment. At the price
p‘ðb;cÞ there are two equilibria since the one corresponding
to the critical-mass network coincides with the one of
the maximum network. It is easily verified that for
parameter settings satisfying Assumptions 1–3, for eachsegment, the switching point is strictly between the
starting point and the ending point. Moreover, the
switching point pðbÞ of the critical-mass-network segment
exceeds the switching point pðaÞof the no-network
segment.
At the no-network segment only one platform is active,
the firm. The switching point indicates the price level at
which the market switches from being fully served to par-
tially served. At the critical-mass-network segment, the
two platforms co-exist. Here, again, the switching point
indicates a switch from a fully served to a partially-served
market. For the maximum-network segment, the switch-
ing point indicates a switch from a multi-platformed to a
single-platformed market. Along this whole segment the
market is fully served.
Different parameter values of b, c, r and s can lead to
five scenarios, depending on how the starting point p‘ðb;cÞ
of both network segments is related to the switching point
pðaÞ of the no-network segment and how the switching
point pðcÞ of the maximum-network segment is positioned
relative to the switching point of the other two segments.
In the three A scenarios, the starting point p‘ðb;cÞ of both net-
work segments is less than or equal to the switching point
pðaÞ of the no-network segment, and the reverse holds for
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c P 2s s2r and the B scenarios do when c < 2s s
2
r .
Since the switching point pðbÞof the critical-mass-
network segment exceeds the switching point pðaÞ of the
no-network segment, the switching point pðcÞ of the maxi-
mum-network segment can be greater than or equal to pðbÞ;
which is the case if and only if c 6 2s and (c 6 s22rþ s or
c P 2s2r þ s), the switching point pðcÞ can belong to the
interval ½pðaÞ; pðbÞ; which is the case if and only if c 6 2s
and s22rþ s 6 c 6 2s
2
r þ s, and the switching point pðcÞ can
be less than or equal to pðaÞ; which is the case if and only
if c P 2s. In this way we obtain three subcases for each
of the two scenarios, resulting in scenarios A.1, A.2, A.3,
and in scenarios B.1, B.2, and B.3, where the set of param-
eter values giving rise to B.3 is void. Table 3 presents the
parameter values that give rise to the five possible scenar-
ios, where we have eliminated redundant constraints.
Fig. 2 illustrates scenarios A.1 and B.1.
Notice that all inequalities in Table 3 only involve the
parameters c, s and r, and are independent of b. Moreover,
notice that all inequalities are homogeneous such that we
can assume r = 1 without loss of generality. That is, when-
ever (c,s,r) satisfies the conditions of a particular scenario,
so does ðcr ; sr ;1Þ. For r = 1, Fig. 3 displays, in (s,c)-space,
how the scenarios are related to one another.
In Fig. 3, the concave-shaped curve separates the A sce-
narios, with p‘ðb;cÞ 6 p

ðaÞ, from the B scenarios, where
p‘ðb;cÞ > p

ðaÞ. Roughly speaking, c and s have to be relatively
close for the B scenarios to occur, and conversely c has to
be sufficiently larger than s for the A scenarios to occur.
Intuitively, when c is large compared to s, the desirability
of the digital form dominates the costs caused by taste het-
erogeneity, which makes people located closer to the phys-
ical form more prone to downloading. This leads to the A
scenarios, where the firm perceives a lot of pressure from
the network, i.e. even when the firm sets a low price,
inducing a fully-served market, a network may form.
Finally, before moving on to the analysis of stage one,
the following proposition specifies (independent of the
scenarios) the behavior of the firm’s profit along each of
the segments. Its proof is straightforward when using theFig. 3. Parameter settings leading to each of the scenarios.expressions for the consumer that is indifferent between
her first-best – buying from the firm – and her second-best
choice, as derived in Appendices A and B.
Proposition 2. Along each segment the profit of the firm is
continuous in price. For each price, the profit on the no-
network segment is larger than the profit on the critical-mass-
network segment, which is in turn larger than the profit on
maximum-network segment. At the ending point the profit is
zero on each segment. Along the no-network segment the
profit is equal to the price until the switching point and is
concave afterwards. The profit at the starting point on both
network segments is equal to sr times the price. Along the
maximum-network segment the profit is zero after the
switching point.
Intuitively, for a given price with multiple equilibria in
the second stage, the firm always has a higher profit if
the network is not formed. At the ending point of each seg-
ment the price is b, which will result in no sales, and hence
zero profit. Before the switching point on the no-network
segment, the sales quantity is exactly one (the full market);
therefore the profit is equal to the price. After the switch-
ing point, the sales quantity decreases in price and the
profit is therefore concave in price. At the starting point
of both network segments, the network size is identical
for the critical-mass network and the maximum network,
and the sales quantity is less than one. After this starting
point, the size of the critical-mass network starts to de-
crease and the size of the maximum network starts to in-
crease. The profit along the maximum-network segment
after the switching point is zero because there are no sales.
The profits along the no-network segment (a), the critical-
mass-network segment (b), and the maximum-network
segment (c) are illustrated in Fig. 4. Note that in Fig. 4,
the profit on the no-network segment (a) at a price equal
to p‘ðb;cÞ is not guaranteed to exceed the global maximum
of the profit on the maximum-network segment (c). More-
over, in the B scenarios it is possible that the global maxi-
mum of the profit on the no-network segment (a) is
attained at a price below p‘ðb;cÞ.
4. The firm’s decision
4.1. Subgame-perfect Nash equilibria
Using the definition of a subgame-perfect Nash equilib-
rium and the results of the previous section, the following
result is immediate.
Proposition 3. The strategy profile (p*, d*) is a subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if, for every p 2 [0,b],
d*(p) is consistent with one of the second-stage equilibrium
structures of Proposition 1 and p(p*, d*(p*)) P p(p,d*(p)).
In order to analyze which pairs of prices and consumer
decisions (p,d(p)) can be supported as a subgame-perfect
equilibrium outcome, it is convenient to define the firm-
worst response of the consumers. Let therefore dLE be the
mapping that assigns to each price the equilibrium struc-
ture that generates the lowest profit for the firm, except
at the starting price p‘ðb;cÞ ¼ b cþ s s
2
r of the network
Fig. 4. Profit along segments; scenario A.1 (left); scenario B.1 (right).
Fig. 5. The lower envelope of the different scenarios (left: A scenarios; right: B scenarios).
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the no-network equilibrium structure, so dxLEðpÞ ¼ S,
x 2 [0,1]. LE stands for ‘‘lower envelope”. For the five sce-
narios depicted in Table 3, the corresponding lower-enve-
lope mappings are depicted in Fig. 5. Notice that the
lower envelope of the three A scenarios has the structure
as displayed in the left panel and the two B scenarios as
displayed in the right panel. Moreover, the lower envelope
only involves the no-network segment and the maximum-
network segment, but not the critical-mass-network seg-
ment. We define the maximum profit along the lower
envelope by pLE ¼ maxppðp; dLEðpÞÞ. Proposition 2 and the
definition of the lower envelope guarantees that the max-
imum exists, even though p(p,dLE(p)) is not everywhere
continuous in p. We have the following characterization
of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes.Proposition 4. The pair (p*, d*(p*)) is a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium outcome if and only if d*(p*) is consistent with one
of the second-stage equilibrium structures of Proposition 1
and pðp; dðpÞÞP pLE.Proof.
()) Let (p*,d*) be a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
with equilibrium outcome (p*,d*(p*)). Proposition 3
implies that d*(p*) is consistent with one of the sec-
ond-stage equilibrium structures of Proposition 1.
Since, given d* the firm has no incentive to deviate from
p*, we have, for every p 2 [0,b],pðp;dðpÞÞP pðp; dðpÞÞ:
For p 2 ½0; b n fp‘ðb;cÞg, it holds that p(p,d*(p)) P p(p,dLE(p)),






pðp; dLEðpÞÞ ¼ pLE;where the first inequality uses that p(p,dLE(p)) is continu-
ous from the left at p‘ðb;cÞ.
() We define the consumers’ strategy profile ~dLE by
~d LEðpÞ ¼ dðpÞ and ~d LEðpÞ ¼ dLEðpÞ for p – p*. By Prop-
osition 3, ðp; ~dLEÞ is a subgame-perfect Nash equilib-
rium, and therefore (p*,d*(p*)) a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium outcome, if pðp; ~dLEðpÞÞP pðp; ~dLEðpÞÞ for
every p 2 [0,b]. This inequality holds since, by assump-
tion, pðp; ~dLEðpÞÞP pLE, and pLE P pðp; ~d LEðpÞÞ for
p – p*by definition of pLE. h4.2. Equilibrium selection
To deal with the multiplicity of subgame-perfect equi-
libria, we follow the convention by supposing that, once
the price is known, consumers coordinate on the equilib-
rium continuation that they prefer, which is the one with
the largest network size.4 To avoid continuity problems,
we assume coordination on the firm for the knife-edge case
when the price equals p‘ðb;cÞ. This corresponds to the firm-
worst response of the consumers, which is captured by our
lower envelope. In this subsection, we therefore study the
firm’s optimal pricing behavior along the lower envelope.
Guided by Fig. 5, we treat the A scenarios and the B scenarios
separately, and refer to them as scenario A and scenario B,
respectively..
For the convenience in notation, we define d  4s2 
3r(b  c + s). Roughly speaking, d represents the attrac-
tiveness of the network relative to the firm. Indeed, d is
increasing in c  b and decreasing in r. Without loss of
generality, we assume that when different first-stage
prices lead to identical second-stage profit levels, the
firm selects the price that results in the smallest network
size.
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lower envelope is given by:
pðp;dLEðpÞÞ ¼







ðb;cÞ < p 6 p

ðcÞ
0 if pðcÞ < p 6 b:
8><
>>:
The profit in the interval [N] is zero. The profit in the inter-
val [S] reaches its maximum at the right boundary point
p‘ðb;cÞ, which we denote by p½S ¼ b cþ s s
2
r . The profit
in the interval [S/N]m.n. starts at sr ðb cþ s s
2
r Þ, which is
a share sr of p

½S. At this point it decreases with a slope of
1, and ends up equal to zero at the price pðcÞ ¼ b
cþ s. However, before it reaches zero, it may increase
and then subsequently decrease, achieving a local maxi-



















This expression is only valid if d is non-negative, which
incidentally also guarantees that the price is in the respec-
tive interval, i.e. d P 0 implies p‘ðb;cÞ < p

½S=Nm:n:
< pðcÞ. In that





























Thus, the firm sets a price of p½S=Nm:n: if and only if d P 0 and
p½S=Nm:n: > p

½S. This leads to a multi-platformed fully-served
market with co-existence of the firm and the network. If
d P 0, but p½S=Nm:n: 6 p

½S, the firm sets a network-deterring
price equal to p‘ðb;cÞ, which leads to a single-platformed
fully-served market with network-deterring pricing.5 The
firm sets the same network-deterring price in case d < 0.
Scenario B. In scenario B, the firm’s profit along the
lower envelope is given by:
pðp;dLEðpÞÞ ¼
p if 0 6 p 6 pðaÞ







ðb;cÞ < p 6 p

ðcÞ
0 if pðcÞ < p 6 b
8>>><
>>>:
Again, the profit in the interval [N] is zero. In the interval
[S], the maximum profit is achieved at a price equal to
pðaÞ. This is a global maximum on the whole lower envelope
if and only if b P 2s. In this case, the firm optimally serves
the whole market. Next, in the interval [S/;], the maximum
profit is achieved at the price p ¼ 12 b. This is the global
maximum on the lower envelope if and only if
2ðc sþ s2r Þ < b < 2s. In that case, the firm optimally
serves the market partially as a monopoly, and there will
be no network.5 Our assumption that when different first-stage prices lead to identical
second-stage profit levels, the firm selects the price that results in the
smallest network size, implies in this case that the firm selects the
network-deterring price rather than the co-existence price when both
prices lead to the same profit level.If b 6 2ðc sþ s2r Þ, the situation is similar to scenario A.
The maximum profit in the interval [S/;] is achieved at the
price p‘ðb;cÞ ¼ b cþ s s
2
r , yielding p

½S=; ¼ ðb cþ s s
2
r Þ











< pðcÞ) and p½S=Nm:n: > p

½S=;. This leads to a
multi-platformed fully-served market with the co-existence
of the firm and the network. Otherwise the firm sets a net-
work-deterring price equal to p‘ðb;cÞ, which leads to a single-
platformed partially-served market with network-deterring
pricing.
Observe that, in scenario B, on top of the network-
deterring pricing and co-existence cases like in scenario
A, we have two cases of monopoly pricing, under the condi-
tion that b is sufficiently high when compared to s. Notice
also that the network-deterring pricing in scenario B
occurs in a partially-served market as opposed to a fully-
served market in scenario A.
We summarize the findings from our studies of the sce-
narios above in the following propositions.
Proposition 5. The firm acts as a monopolist if and only if
c < 2s s
2
r





If in addition b P 2s, the market is fully served; otherwise it is
partially served.
The first inequality in this proposition ensures that we
are in scenario B.
Proposition 5 indicates that when the quality of the
physical form of the product is sufficiently high and the
one of the digital form is sufficiently low, the firm can
monopolize the market. In case the gross value of the prod-
uct exceeds by far the transportation costs caused by taste
heterogeneity, the firm is willing to serve the whole mar-
ket. When this is not the case, the firm does not attempt
to sell to the consumers with strong preferences for the
digital form. Notice that, here, the firm disregards the net-
work in its pricing. This is not the case in the next
proposition.
Proposition 6. There are parameter constellations such that,
in equilibrium, the firm applies network-deterring pricing.
This is the case with a fully-served market if and only if
c P 2s s
2
r
and ðd < 0 or p½S=Nm:n: 6 p

½SÞ;
and the case with a partially-served market if and only if
c < 2s s
2
r





< 0 or p½S=Nm:n: 6 p

½S=;Þ:
When the digital form is above a certain quality level, or
when the physical form is below a certain quality level, the
network has sufficient potential to form and the firm is no
longer able to apply monopoly pricing. Stated differently,
the firm is disciplined by the threat of the network form-
ing. However, when the generic cost factor of downloading
r is sufficiently large (such that d is negative), the firm is
able to price as such to deter the network from developing.
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if the conditions in the previous two propositions are not met.
This is the case if and only if
c P 2s s
2
r




c < 2s s
2





In such a case, the market is fully served.Fig. 6. A graphical illustration of the possible subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium market structures.
6 The proofs of the signs in the tables in Propositions 6–8 are provided in
Appendix C.Proof. It holds that the conditions in Propositions 5 and 6
are not met if and only if
c P 2s s
2
r




c < 2s s
2
r





P 0; and p½S=Nm:n: > p

½S=;:








so we can omit the condition on b. h
Propositions 5–7 above indicate that the parameter
d = 4s2  3r(b  c + s) plays an important role in deter-
mining market outcomes. Recall that dcorresponds to the
attractiveness of the network relative to the firm. For the
conditions in Proposition 7 to be satisfied, d must be posi-
tive. Thus, for the two platforms to co-exist, the two forms
of the product should not be too distinct in quality and the
generic cost factor of downloading should be sufficiently
low. It can be shown that the inequalities in Proposition
5, where monopoly is the equilibrium market outcome, re-
quire d to be negative.
We close this section with a graphical illustration of
how the different equilibrium market structures are lo-
cated in the parameter space. For the case with both b
and r equal to 1, Fig. 6 presents the areas described in
the propositions in (s,c)-space, where ‘mon’, ‘det’ and ‘co’
refer to monopoly (Proposition 5), network-deterring pric-
ing (Proposition 6) and co-existence (Proposition 7)
respectively, and ‘fs’ and ‘ps’ refer to a fully-served and
partially-served market respectively.
The concave curve is identical to the one in Fig. 3, and
separates scenario A (to the left of the curve) from scenario
B (to the right of the curve). A monopoly can only exist in
scenario B, either if s 6 12 (fully-served market), or if s >
1
2
and 2(c  s + s2) < 1 (partially-served market). This sug-
gests that for the monopoly to exist, c should not be too
high when compared to b, so the quality of the physical
form of the product should be sufficiently superior to the
one of the digital form. Furthermore, the ratio cs should
not be too high, which means that sufficient taste hetero-
geneity among the consumers is necessary. Co-existence,
on the other hand, occurs both in scenario A and B, but only
in the far upper-right corner. This requires s to besufficiently large, which intuitively suggests that when
taste heterogeneity is large, it does not pay off for the firm
to deter the network from developing. Hence, the firm will
accommodate the existence of the network. Everywhere
else we find monopoly with network-deterring pricing in
either a fully-served (in scenario A) or partially-served
market (in scenario B). This shows that there is quite some
room for the firm to manipulate the price and deter the
development of the network.
5. Comparative statics
In this section, we conduct some comparative-static
analysis on the equilibrium outcomes of the subgame-per-
fect Nash equilibria discussed in the previous section. We
will treat them separately according to their market struc-
tures. Recall that p*, s*, n*, and p* are the equilibrium price,
the sales quantity of the firm, the network size, and the
firm’s profit respectively. CS* and W* denote the equilibrium
consumers’ surplus and the total welfare respectively.
5.1. Monopoly
Proposition 8. The signs of the first-order partial derivatives
of the equilibrium values with respect to the parameters in the
case of the monopoly market are as shown in Table 4.6
The findings here are intuitive. For example, in a fully-
served monopolistic market, the consumers’ surplus does
not increase when the basic utility of the physical form
of the product b increases, because the price increases by
the same amount. The firm’s profit increases and hence to-
tal welfare increases. An increase in taste heterogeneity s
decreases the price by exactly the same amount since the
firm must keep the last consumer (whose transportation
cost is exactly s) on board. This results in a lower profit
for the firm, while consumers benefit from the lower price.
Table 4
Monopoly pricing with fully-served market (a); monopoly pricing with
partially-served market (b). The cells display the signs of the first
derivatives.
b c s r
(a)
p* + 0  0
s* 0 0 0 0
n* 0 0 0 0
p* + 0  0
CS* 0 0 + 0
W* + 0  0
(b)
p* + 0 0 0
s* + 0  0
n* 0 0 0 0
p* + 0  0
CS* + 0  0
W* + 0  0
Table 5
Fully-served market (a); partially-served market (b). The cells display the
signs of the first derivatives.
b c s r
(a)
p* +  ± +
s* 0 0 0 0
n* 0 0 0 0
p* +  ± +
CS* 0 + ± 
W* + 0  0
(b)
p* +  ± +
s* 0 +  
n* 0 0 0 0
p* +   +
CS* 0 + ± 
W* + +  
7 Both inequalities on parameter values are consistent with the condi-
tions of Proposition 6.
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heterogeneity is less than the decrease in price. Therefore,
the total consumers’ surplus increases in taste heterogene-
ity. Total welfare, however, decreases due to the larger loss
in profit. The basic utility of the digital form c and the gen-
eric cost factor of downloading r do not influence any of
the endogenous variables, since small variations in it do
not lead to the establishment of the network.
In the partially-served monopolistic market, a larger ba-
sic utility b leads to more sales, higher price, higher profit,
and higher welfare; whereas a larger taste heterogeneity s
leads to lower sales, lower profit, and lower welfare. Unlike
in the fully-served monopoly market, the basic utility of
the digital form c and the generic cost factor of download-
ing r do not influence any of the endogenous variables.
5.2. Network-deterring pricing
Proposition 9. The comparative statics on the network-
deterring pricing market structure are as shown in Table 5.
In case the market is fully served by the firm, the price
is the same as the profit. They both increase in the quality
of the physical form b and decrease in that of the ‘rival’ dig-
ital form c, because a lower price is needed to deter the
network from forming. Moreover, for the same reason,
they both increase in the generic cost factor of download-
ing r. As a result, consumers’ surplus increases in c, thanks
to the lower price charged for the product, but decreases in
r, due to the higher price. Total welfare increases in b,
thanks to the higher profit, but does not depend on c or
r. The reason is that in the fully-served market with net-
work-deterring pricing, c and r only have an effect via
the price of the product, and therefore only affect the dis-
tribution of surplus between the consumers and the firm.
An increase in the taste heterogeneity s makes consumers
less likely to switch platforms, and may lead to either an
increase or a decrease in price. When r is relatively low,
in particular if r < 2s, an increase in s leads to a lower
price, and consequently a lower profit. However, for larger
values of r, the price and the profit increase when s in-
creases. The intuition is that when the taste heterogeneityincreases, the digital form becomes less attractive for the
consumers, an effect which is further amplified via a smal-
ler expected network size. For larger values of the cost fac-
tor, high heterogeneity increases the expected costs of
downloading sufficiently in order to shade the competition
that the firm is facing from the network and allows the
firm to increase the price without losing any sales.
Although the effect on the consumers’ surplus can be posi-
tive or negative, total welfare suffers from higher s.
A difference we notice when the market is only partially
served is that the effects of c and r on the the firm’ sales
quantity change. A decrease in c and an increase in r
makes the network less competitive, and triggers an in-
crease in price p*, and leads to less sales s*. When it comes
to the profit, p*, the price effect dominates the quantity ef-
fect. Thus, the comparative statics of prices and profits go
in the same direction, similar to the case where the market
is fully served. The total welfare W* depends on c and r as
well. It goes the opposite direction as the firm’s price p*.
With a lower c or a higher r, leading to a higher price,
the gain in profit in the partially-served market is less than
that in the fully-served market, due to a lower sales
quantity. The effect on the consumers’ surplus being the
same, total welfare decreases, which explains the positive
sign for c and the negative one for r. An increase in s also
affects sales negatively, but the consequences for the price
are again ambiguous. As with the fully-served market, the
price decreases if r < 2s and increases if r > 2s.7 An
increase in s may now lead to either higher or lower con-
sumers’ surplus, depending on the quantitative significance
of the decrease in sales, the increase in transportation cost,
and the change in price. The change in total welfare is unam-
biguously negative when s increases.
Even when the network does not form, its attractive-
ness (represented by a high c and a low r) does have a neg-
ative impact on the firm’s profit and a positive impact on
the total welfare. This has some implications for intellec-
tual property rights policy, which we will discuss later.
Table 6
Co-existence of the firm and the network with a fully-served market. The
cells display the signs of the first derivatives.
b c s r
p* +  + 
s* +   +
n*  + + 
p* +  + +
CS*  +  
W* + +  
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of the firm and the network in a fully-served market are as
shown in Table 6.
One can argue that nowadays the co-existence case
prevails in reality, probably most prominently so in the
music industry. Here we find some very interesting re-
sults. An increase in b leads to a higher price, sales, profit,
and a lower network size. Surprisingly, consumer surplus
is affected negatively by an increase in b. The negative ef-
fects of a higher price and a lower network size outweigh
the increase in quality b. Total welfare varies positively
with b.
The comparative statics with respect to s confirm the
usual intuitions. An increase in s leads to a higher price
and profit, lower sales, and a bigger network. The consum-
ers’ surplus and total welfare are affected negatively.
The equilibrium price p* decreases in the generic cost
factor of downloading r, despite the fact that the equilib-
rium network size n* decreases in r. This result implies
that, in equilibrium, the higher the cost factor r, the lower
the firm sets its price: a counter-intuitive result, since a
higher r makes the network less strong as a competitor
of the firm. The negative correlation is caused by the shape
of the cost function of downloading C(n), which is convex
and decreasing in the network size n. In other words, since
downloading costs decrease with the network size at a
diminishing rate, it makes the first few consumers who
join the network more vital in determining the costs (or
the price, effectively) of downloading. The firm, therefore,
has an incentive to ‘‘play tough” by means of a low price
when the equilibrium network size is relatively small
(large r). Conversely, if r is small, the equilibrium network
size is large, and the network is stronger and will form
more easily. In that case, the firm can do better by backing
off from the competition and charging a high price to reap
the most profit out of the customers that are more eager to
buy the physical form of the product. This outcome follows
because the equilibrium profit p* is increasing in r, despite
the decreasing price. What we observe here, therefore, is a
very interesting form of platform competition. Moreover,
similar to the partially-served market network-deterring
pricing case, total welfare W* decreases in r. This result im-
plies that it maybe welfare enhancing for the internet
infrastructure of the country to be improved, and for the
legal enforcements of intellectual property rights to be
relaxed.5.4. Comparative statics across market structures
In the above subsections we have shown comparative
statics in the three different market structures separately.
In this subsection we analyze how equilibrium values
change across the market structures as a function of the
most important parameter in the model, r. We show
graphically how equilibrium price, profit and total welfare
change in relation to r. In order to make a clear sketch, we
display the limit case where b, c and s are equal to 1. We
allow r to vary on the horizontal axis and put the equilib-
rium values on the vertical axis. Fig. 7 shows the equilib-
rium price, profit and welfare responding to changes in r.
When the generic cost factor of downloading r is very
high, the traditional monopoly setting results, as one
would expect. As this cost factor decreases, the price, the
profit and total welfare remain unaffected as long as the
market structure remains unchanged. Once r becomes suf-
ficiently small (less than 2), the firm has to adapt its pricing
strategy, because the network becomes a vital enemy to
the firm. As long as r is not too small (larger than 54), the
firm optimally deters the forming of the network. In this
region, the price and the profit are decreasing for decreas-
ing values of r. The profit is decreasing at an increasing
rate. Total welfare, however, increases. In case the cost fac-
tor becomes very small r < 54
 
, the firm optimally toler-
ates the network and refrains from further deterring
behavior. This results in a discontinuous increase in price
and welfare as the market tips from a single-platformed
structure towards a multi-platformed one. From here, the
equilibrium price and welfare gradually increase as r de-
creases. The profit continues to decrease, but only de-
creases at a diminishing rate.
The comparative statics with a decreasing rcan be ap-
plied to what happened in the last decade with the arrival
of the P2P networks. We conclude that, although the soci-
ety as a whole unambiguously benefits from a decrease in
the generic cost factor of downloading, the firm unambig-
uously suffers from it despite a non-monotonic optimal
pricing policy. One can, therefore, only expect every at-
tempt possible from the firm to make file-sharing and
downloading very difficult and costly indeed.6. Discussion
The results of this paper have a bearing on intellectual
property rights policy. We have shown that the total wel-
fare unambiguously increases when the generic cost factor
of downloading decreases, in particular, when there is less
protection of intellectual property. To give further under-
pinnings for this conclusion, one would like to extend the
model with a part that involves the creation of new con-
tent, and analyze how quality and quantity of new content
is affected by intellectual property rights. As shown in
Johnson (1985) and Bae and Choi (2006), these effects are
complicated and can depend on various factors, including
the nature of piracy costs and the value consumers place
on product variety.
The model and its results presented in this paper can
also be applied outside the context of P2P file-sharing or
Fig. 7. Equilibrium price (left), profit (middle), and welfare (right) across markets structures.
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to any situation where a monopoly is faced with a free out-
side option that exhibits positive network externalities. An
example would be the competition between commercial
software against freely distributed open-source software,
such as the market for operating systems, with Microsoft
representing the firm and Linux representing the digital
form. The externalities would in this case be related to
the amount of support users of a particular platform can
expect, as well as the availability of software that is com-
patible with the operating system chosen. Similar to the
case studied in this paper, the marginal contribution of
an additional user to the other users of the platform is
diminishing in the size of the network. However, in this
application, both platforms would create externalities for
its users, which calls for an interesting extension of our
model.
Another interesting application would involve an exten-
sion of the model of trading platforms as analyzed in Nocke
et al. (2007). The authors study the effects of different plat-
form ownership structures on the platform size, as well as
on consumer and total surplus. In their model, buyers can
either visit the trading platform or take the outside option.
Regarding the outside option it is assumed that no exter-
nalities are present. Allowing for positive externalities
among buyers taking the outside option, would affect the
outcome of the trading platform, and it is natural to expect
that these externalities interact with the platform owner-
ship structure.7. Conclusion
This paper investigates the competition between a
monopolistic information content provider offering the
physical form of the product and a P2P file-sharing net-
work (offering the digital form), where consumers that
opt for the P2P network benefit from the presence of other
consumers due to decreased search costs and downloading
time and increased availability. The model has four param-
eters that capture, respectively, the quality of the physical
form of the product, the quality of the digital form, the le-
vel of consumers’ taste heterogeneity, and the generic cost
factor of downloading. This latter factor incorporateselements such as population computer literacy, the avail-
ability of broadband internet infrastructure, and in partic-
ular, the degree of legal enforcement of intellectual
property rights.
We give a complete characterization of the subgame-
perfect Nash equilibria of the model as well as of the sub-
game-perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes. We show that,
depending on the parameter values, several market struc-
tures may result. These market structures differ not only
in the number of platforms being active (one or two) and
the level at which the market is served (fully or partially),
but also in the firm’s pricing policy. A market structure
without any network is compatible both with monopoly
pricing by the firm as well as with a network-deterring
pricing policy. Given fixed values for the other parameters,
as we gradually decrease the generic cost factor of down-
loading, the market experiences first the single platform
(the firm) with monopoly pricing, then the single platform
(the firm) with network-deterring pricing, and finally co-
existence of multiple competing platforms (the firm and
the network). In addition, we find that the equilibrium
price moves in the opposite direction of the downloading
cost factor in case the two platforms co-exist. Although,
in general, the price behaves non-monotonically when
the cost factor of downloading becomes smaller, the profit
unambiguously decreases. The total welfare, on the other
hand, unambiguously increases.Acknowledgement
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The consumer z 2 (0,1) that separates the consumers
choosing for the firm from those choosing for the network,
is herself indifferent between the two options. Moreover
this consumer should weakly prefer the firm to the
option not to acquire the product. So, for a second-stage
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hold that
0 6 Uzðp; dz; SÞ ¼ Uzðp; dz;NÞ () 0 6 b sz p
¼ c sð1 zÞ  rð1 nðp;dÞÞ2;
where n(p,d) = 1  z, since the market is fully served. Solv-














where we call the solution corresponding to the smaller
network size (zc.m.) the critical-mass network, and the solu-
tion corresponding to the larger network size (zm.n.) the
maximum network. In order to guarantee the solution to
be real, we need




For the market structure [S/N]* to exist, the other condi-
tions needed are:
0 6 zðpÞ < 1 and b szðpÞ  p P 0:
The next two subsections deal with the maximum network
and the critical-mass network, respectively.
A.1. The maximum network
Assume Inequality (1) holds. The maximum network
solution exists for the multi-platformed and fully-served











rðpþ c b sÞ þ s2
p
r
 p P 0: ð2Þ
The first condition is equivalent to
p 6 b cþ s and
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
rðpþ c b sÞ þ s2
q
> s r;
where the second inequality is trivially satisfied owing to
the assumption that r > s and using Inequality (1). The sec-
ond condition is equivalent toffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi





We will argue next that the second condition is always sat-
isfied. In case the right-hand side of the inequality above is
negative, i.e. in case p < b s2r , the inequality is trivially




ðb pÞ2  ðb pÞ  ðc sÞ 6 0;




















Because c > s, the lower bound on p is less than b s2r and
therefore satisfied since we are considering the case
p P b s2r . The upper bound is larger than b. Hence the sec-
ond condition does not impose a further restriction on p.
Hence, Inequalities (1) and (2) boil down to
b cþ s s
2
r
6 p 6 b cþ s:A.2. The critical-mass network
Assume Inequality (1) holds. The critical-mass network
solution exists for the multi-platformed and fully-served











rðpþ c b sÞ þ s2
p
r
 p P 0; ð3Þ
Notice that the first inequality of the first condition is triv-
ially satisfied and that the second inequality of this condi-
tion can be simplified to
p < b c sþ r:
The second inequality is equivalent to
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi





ðb pÞ  s:
This condition holds only if the right-hand side of this
inequality is non-negative, that is p 6 b s2r , and
r
s2
ðb pÞ2  ðb pÞ  ðc sÞP 0;
where the latter inequality is equivalent to




















Since c > s, the right-hand side of the second inequality ex-
ceeds b and hence cannot be satisfied—leaving the first
inequality to be satisfied. Moreover, the right-hand side
of the first inequality is less than b s2r , hence the second
condition is satisfied if and only if










Next we show that the second condition is more restrictive
than the first condition. Suppose the opposite holds true.
That is, suppose that









> b c sþ r:








ðcþ s rÞ  1: ð4Þ
For Inequality (4) to be satisfied, the right-hand side has to
be positive, which is the case when
2rðcþ s rÞ  s2 > 0: ð5Þ
Inequality (4) then implies that
r
s2
ðcþ s rÞ2 > 2c r;
which in turn implies that
2s2 þ rðr cÞ  2sr > 0: ð6Þ
We argue that Inequality (5) and (6) cannot be satisfied
simultaneously. By adding Inequality (5) to twice Inequal-
ity (6) we find that s > 23 r: Since we deal with two homog-
enous polynomial inequalities, we can set one of the
parameters to any positive number. We set c = 1 and real-
ize that this induces s < 1 < r. Moreover, s > 23 rimplies












The first of these inequalities is in direct conflict with
s > 23 r, which leaves the second inequality as the only





2 has to be less than 1, so r has to be less
than 1 or to be larger than 2, which contradicts











6 b c sþ r:
Hence, Inequalities (1) and (3) boil down to
b cþ s s
2
r










Appendix B. The partially-served multi-platformed
market
The consumer zS 2 (0,1) (zN 2 (0,1)) that separates the
consumers choosing for the firm (network) from those
choosing not to acquire any product, is herself indifferent
between the two options. Moreover, this consumer prefers
both the firm (network) and no acquisition to the option to
acquire via the network (firm). We have a partially-served
market if there is an interval of consumers that prefers no
acquisition to acquisition, meaning that zS is less than zN.
So, for a second-stage equilibrium (p,d) to generate the




; SÞ ¼ UzS ðp;dz
S
; ;Þ and UzN ðp;dz
N
;NÞ
¼ UzN ðp; dz
N
; ;Þand
0 6 zSðpÞ < zNðpÞ 6 1:
The first two equations are equivalent to
b szS  p ¼ 0 and c sð1 zNÞ  rð1 nðp;dÞÞ2 ¼ 0:
where n(p,d) = 1  zN. Solving the first equation for zS and
the latter for zN gives us one solution for zS:
zSðpÞ ¼ b p
s
;















B.1. The maximum network
It is easily seen that zNm:n: is negative, so the maximum
network solution cannot co-exist with a partially-served
multi-platformed market.
B.2. The critical-mass network
The critical-mass network solution exists for the multi-











The first inequality is satisfied, since p 6 b. Owing to the









s2 þ 4rðc sÞ
q
< 2r s () c < r:
The second inequality is equivalent to





















< p:Appendix C. Support for Propositions 6–8
In this Appendix we support our comparative statics re-
sults in Section 5. For each of the five different scenarios
we provide the respective equilibrium values. Once a sign
of the derivative of these values with respect to one of
the model’s parameters is not straightforward (that is, if
the factor appears in multiple terms in possibly opposite
directions), we provide the precise derivations.
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s* ¼1 0 0 0 0
n* ¼0 0 0 0 0
p* ¼b  s + 0  0
CS* ¼ 12 s 0 0 + 0
W* ¼b 12 s + 0  0C.2. Monopoly pricing and partially-served marketb c s rp* ¼ 12 b + 0 0 0
s* ¼ 12s b + 0  0
n* ¼0 0 0 0 0
p* ¼ 14s b
2 + 0  0
CS* ¼ 18s b
2 + 0  0
W* ¼ 38s b
2 + 0  0C.3. Network-deterring pricing and fully-served marketb c s rp* ¼b cþ s s2r +  ±
1 +s* ¼1 0 0 0 0
n* ¼0 0 0 0 0
p* ¼b cþ s s2r +  ±
1 +CS* ¼ c 32 sþ s
2
r
0 + ±2 W* ¼b 12 s + 0  0     1. sign @p
@s ¼ sign @p@s ¼ sign 1 2sr ¼ signðr 2sÞ. We
have found parameter values compatible with the con-
ditions in Proposition 6 that support a positive sign as





¼ sign  32þ 2sr
 
¼ sign 43 s r
 
. As in 1.,
both positive and negative signs are found.
C.4. Network-deterring pricing and partially-served marketb c s rp* ¼ b cþ s s2r +  ±
1 +s* ¼ 1s ðc sþ s
2
r Þ 0 + 
2 n* ¼0 0 0 0 0
p* ¼ ðb cþ s s2r Þ 1s ðc sþ s
2
r Þ + 
3 4 +5CS* ¼ 12s ðc sþ s
2
r Þ
2 0 + ±6 W* ¼ ðb 12 ðc sþ s
2
r ÞÞ 1s ðc sþ s
2
r Þ + +
7 8 9   
1. sign @p
@s ¼ sign 1 2sr ¼ signðr 2sÞ. We have found
parameter values compatible with the conditions in







r < 0, since cr > s
2.
3. @p




< 0, since one of the condi-
tions in Proposition 6 is b 6 2ðc sþ s2r Þ.4. @p
@s ¼    ¼  1s2 ðb cþ
s2
r Þ c sþð s
2
r Þ þ 1s2 b cþ sð
s2
r Þ
sð þ2 s2r Þ ¼    ¼  1s2 bð
	









 2g < 0, since b > c and b < 2 c sþ s2r .
5. @p




 bÞ > 0, again, using the condi-
tion in Proposition 6.
6. We have found parameter values compatible with the
conditions in Proposition 6 that support a positive sign
as well as a negative one.
7. @W






8. As a result of an increase in s, the demand curve shifts
inward. Moreover, the number of consumers decreases
as a result of the increase in s. Both effects induce a
decrease in welfare. In formulas, W ¼
R 1s csþs2r 
x¼0





for each x, b  sx decreases. Since for each x in the
domain of integration b  sx is positive, it follows that
W decreases as s increases.
9. @W














  +1 2 +3 4




  +  5 +6
























+13 +14 15 162where d = 4s  3r(b  c + s)Notice that CS ¼ b 1 ss  p

 










2 12 s; s
 
.







directly from r,b > c > s and d P 0. Left to be shown isffiffiffi
d
p


































 ð9r 8sÞs > 0:




it is easily shown
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1
4












P 3r 2s () r P s













 ð9rc 9rsþ s2Þ > 0:

























if and only ifffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ðrc rsþ s2Þð9rc 9rsþ s2Þ
q
P 3rc 3rsþ s2;
which is the case if and only if c P s, we have shown thatffiffiffi
d
p
> 12 s. h1. @p
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g ¼ 29r 1ffiffidp dþfffiffiffi
d
p
ð3r 4sÞ þ ð4s2  32 rsÞg > 29r 1ffiffidp
fd s2 þ 2s2g > 0.




dr ¼ 12 1ffiffidp ½3ðb cþ sÞ ¼  12 1r
1ffiffi
d

















































þ 32 43 sÞ





































































@c ¼  @p

@b < 0.9. @p


































































¼    ðsee 4:Þ    ¼ 227r2 2sðffiffiffi
d
p


































@r < 0 (using 10. and 16.).
13. @W













































6 s > 0.
14. @W
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If a P 0 then clearly @W
@s < 0. Suppose a < 0. Then



















¼  12952s, where for the first
inequality it has to be noted that 8a2 
11
a þ 3 < 0 for








 a < 
1
2 19 32 s  12952s
 
¼  9104 < 0.
16. @W
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